We analyze the 2019 Chilean social unrest episode using two different approaches: an agent-based model for rioters travelling through public transportation towards strategic locations to protest, and an epidemic-like model that considers global contagious dynamics. We compare the results from both models adjusting the parameters to the Chilean social unrest public data available from the Undersecretary of Human Rights and observe that they lead to similar findings: the number of violent events follows a well-defined pattern already observed in various public disorder episodes in other countries since the sixties. Finally, we model how the contagion effects of rioting could be mitigated.
The social unrest that has been simmering in Chile for a number of years ended up in Oct 2019 in a massive turmoil in the capital city Santiago that quickly turned violent and started spreading into other cities within the country, provoking costly damage to public and private infrastructure, and causing serious injuries to a group of the population. Epidemic-like models can be applied to understand the dynamics of complex social phenomena such as social unrest episodes in which contagion effects could take place, possibly ending in serious infrastructure damage and injuries in the citizenship. Therefore, being able to predict the temporal evolution of a potentially violent crowd and analyze the feasibility to control it, or at least mitigate its effects, is a subject of the utmost importance for any authority involved in politics and security. As extant literature has already noticed for other countries, the Chilean social unrest episodes depict a standard dynamic in which rioting reaches a peak followed by an exponential decay.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social unrest due to economic, political and/or social factors was all over the world news in 2019. A recent report on global political risk 1 shows that a quarter of all the world's countries saw a significant surge in civil unrest during 2019, including locations as diverse as Chile, Haiti, Hong Kong, Lebanon, Nigeria, Sudan and Venezuela. Furthermore, forecasts show that this worrying trend is likely to continue in 2020.
The problem of public disorder, riots and civil unrest has been studied for more than forty years. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] The causes behind each protest is complex and diverse given the unique institutional framework that prevails in each country. Still, all of them somehow end up disrupting the daily lives of the citizenship and, if mishandled, the outbreak can sometimes cascade into large-scale violent manifestations of criminality. 7 Depending on the depth of the social turmoil, it can cause substantial damage to the transport system and to private and public property, while also disrupting supply chains, which neg-atively impacts economic activity and growth. Furthermore, they can also become violent thus evolving into a public security problem that can provoke serious injuries and death. But if it scales into a nation wide phenomena, it can pave the way to political instability or even government overthrown, like in Tunisia and Egypt at the aftermath of the Arab Spring in 2011.
Recently, in October 2019 the world saw the poster child of Latin America, Chile, went through massive demonstrations in the capital city of Santiago, triggered by rising subway fares. Within a few days protesters turned violent and the social turmoil rapidly spread to other regions of the country, forcing local authorities to declare a state of emergency and imposing military curfews in several cities. The first month of unrest alone caused an estimated USD$4.6 billion worth of infrastructure damage, and cost the Chilean economy around USD$3 billion, or 1.1% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1 .
Therefore, the ability to predict the temporal evolution of a potentially violent crowd and analyze the possibility to control it, or at least mitigate its effects, is a subject of the utmost importance for any authority involved in politics and security. It is in this context that mathematical modelling and numerical simulations offer a great advantage over observation, as they could provide profound understanding of the social phenomena under study, allowing at the same time the consideration of several scenarios, including the possibility to test different control or mitigation strategies easily.
Epidemic-like models can be applied to social phenomena such as social unrest episodes in which contagion effects could take place. Burbeck, Raine and Abudu Stark introduced this approach in the seventies to analize large-scale urban riots in Los Angeles, Detroit and Washington D.C. 3 . Inspired by clinical sciences, one initial case of a contagious disease in a large-scale population can easily spread into an epidemic if the infectious individual comes into contact with many susceptible individuals, where each contact represents a certain chance that the susceptible person will contract the infection. In less dense groups, the infected person comes into contact with fewer susceptibles and the chances that he will cease to be infectious before successfully infecting someone else are greater 3 . In fact, the authors find that behavioral epidemics can explain the contagion process of riots that occurred during the sixties in United States, which requires susceptibility of individuals to get involved into rioting as well as contact with the riot, i.e. propagation of social unrest is not provoked by a spatial displacement of rioters. More recently, Bonnasse-Gahot et al. 6 applied similar ideas to the 2005 French riots which started in a poor suburb in Paris and within three weeks they had spread all over France. In line with Burbeck et al., they found that although there was no displacement of rioters, the riot activity did travel. On the other hand, Davies et al. 4 claims, using an agent-based model (ABM), that spatial displacement of individuals is at the basis of the London 2011 episodes of large-scale disorder. Given the spatial configuration of London, some highly transited areas have a larger risk than others of becoming a riot location, implying that the proximity of a particular location to underground train stations, or other public transport nodes, doubles its probability of being looted 5 .
Although the underlying hypothesis of ABM and epidemic models seem to be contradictory, we propose that under some assumptions both models show similar global features and reasonably fit to the empirical data. Therefore, in this paper we aim to answer the following research question: Can we model the 2019 Chilean riot dynamics? To answer this question we compare the available data recorded by the Undersecretary for Human Rights of the Chilean Ministry of Justice and Human Rights with ABM and epidemiological models. We also compare the main characteristics of Chilean riots with other similar events around the world. Finally, we model how contagion effects of rioting could be mitigated, possibly informing local authorities on policy action to ensure peace and order.
The current paper is organized as follows. Section II provides some background information on the Chilean economic and social context, and on the social unrest episodes that started in 2019; the empirical behavior of these events are also discussed. Next, section III analyzes the Chilean riot dynamics at the micro level applying an agent-based model. Section IV presents an epidemic-like model that considers global variables such as the number of events, rioters, and the susceptible population to join a riot. Some extensions that could improve the explanatory power of the model are presented, such as the addition of external sources that can influence the susceptibility of the population to join a rioting episode, which can end up predicting the existence of a temporal behavior that may be either a periodic motion, a quasi-periodic or chaotic motion. In section V both models are compared in terms of how well they fit the Chilean data. Finally, in section VI we provide some final remarks.
II. THE 2019 CHILEAN SOCIAL UNREST

A. Economic and Social Context
The Chilean economy has been usually praised as a successful case since neo-liberal reforms were implemented during the dictatorship period, which lasted from 1973 until 1989.
Since democracy was restored in 1990, the seven ensuing governments continued with the market economic model, although with different "flavors" as a result of social and economic reforms and specific policy approaches implemented by each of them in response to the national and international context 8 . The Chilean economy went through various phases, some of which were quite remarkable in terms of economic growth and improvement of social indicators, like the period 1990-98 where anual GDP growth rates averaged 7.1% 8 and the Gini coefficient dropped from 57.2 in 1990 to 55.5 in 1998 according to estimates of The World Bank (a Gini index of 0 represents perfect income equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality) 9 . Some other phases were marked by the country's vulnerability to external turbulences, such as the Asian crisis in 1998 and the global crisis in late 2008 and 2009. Overall, since 1990 the country's economic performance allowed improving some social indicators in the upcoming decades, such as the percentage of the population living in poverty (on US$ 5.5 per day) which dropped from 46.1% in 1990 to 6.4% in 2017, while life expectancy at birth rose from 73.5 years old to almost 80 during the same period 9 .
Sound macroeconomic policies and fiscal responsibility eventually allowed Chile to be the first South American country to become a member in 2010 of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an exclusive club of thirty six countries that together account for 63% of world GDP. For years Chile has been the poster child of Latin America and has often been considered an example of economic success. After all, steady growth allowed per capita GDP to grow almost sixfold according to The World Bank, from US$4.5k in 1990 to US$25.2k in 2018, exceeding the US$16.6k average per capita income of Latin American and Caribbean countries (per capita GDP is measured in purchase power parity and constant 2011 USD) 9 .
As previously mentioned, indicators that measure economic inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, seem to have been improving in the last decades, which according to the World Bank was reduced from 57.2 in 1990 to 46.6 in 2017. However, this is certainly a mild improvement since Chile is the country with the most unequal income distribution within OECD economies. And although over the past three decades, the gap between the rich and poor has widened in the large majority of OECD countries, the average estimated Gini, excluding Chile, is a much lower 31.1. 10 Furthermore, according to ECLAC, the richest 1% of the Chilean population concentrated almost 27% of the net wealth of the country in 2017. 11 Therefore, it is not surprising that the widespread feeling of social discontentment and unfairness that had been simmering for years in many Chileans turned into the anger that triggered massive protests in October of 2019. A share of the Chilean population, especially the rising middle class, claims that after years of unfulfilled promises regarding economic prosperity for all, "Chile woke up" eventually.
In Fig.1 we summarize the key events that occurred between October and November 2019 and contrast them with the rioting episodes (see more detail in Appendix A). The protests, led by high school and college students, started on October 7 th 2019 in the capital city of Santiago due an in- crease in the subway fare that provoked public outcry. After two weeks protests quickly turned massive and violent and the turmoil started spreading into other cities within the country. On October 18 th 2019 students in Santiago massively evaded the subway fee in defiance over the fare increase. As police attempted to stop students disturbing subway stations, protesters spilled out into the street burning and destroying metro stations, and looting supermarkets, pharmacies, and shops. Since riots could not be controlled by the local police the President, Sebastián Piñera, decided to declare a state of emergency to safeguard public order. Military forces were deployed to the streets in many cities and curfews were enforced. After days of both violent and pacific demonstrations, it was understood that the cause behind the protests was beyond the increase in the subway fare, and it included demands for a substantial improvement in living standards, pensions, health care and education, among other demands. And they wanted these improvements right away. After these violent episodes, and a massive peaceful demonstration that gathered more than a million people on October 25 th 2019 in different locations in Santiago and the rest of the country, the President eventually yielded to the pressing demands of the population and since then some reforms have been announced, including an agreement to hold a referendum on April 26 th 2020 to vote for a change in the Chilean Constitution written in 1980. However, the measures implemented are not considered to be enough and protests are expected to continue in the upcoming months. Therefore, understanding the anatomy of the Chilean protests and how contagion effects of rioting could be mitigated is key to inform local authorities on policy action to ensure peace and order and prevent further damage.
Extant literature shows that, in general, different phases can be identified in a social crisis: a very slow process of warming up that could take a long time, ensued by an abrupt culmination that follows a fast transition as a consequence of a contagion process in the population's behavior, eventually ending in a relaxation phase. The slow evolution that culminates in that fast transition (a "catastrophe") shares many similarities with the Theory of Catastrophes, developed by Thom. 12 This theory can be applied to understand the evolution of the state of social tension in which a population is found, which can be affected by factors related to public policies in education, health, taxes, pension or employment, among others. These factors may increase or decrease this social tension and, eventually, an insignificant variation in some of them (e.g. a rise in the subway fare), may suddenly increase the social tension in such a way that a "catastrophe" occurs. This is interpreted as an abrupt change in the social behavior of the people. Interestingly, because the transition is abrupt (a first order phase transition) it is irreversible: that is, reversing slightly the triggering factor of the "catastrophe" does not lead the society back to the original situation.
The theory of catastrophes previously discussed suggests that the Chilean 2019 social unrest episode has completely changed the state in which the country was embedded. In fact, the population assures that "Chile woke up", and all the measures that are being implemented to control the social crisis are expected to lead the economy towards a "new normality", but not back to the original state.
B. Empirical behavior of the social unrest
The Undersecretary for Human Rights of the Chilean Ministry of Justice and Human Rights releases daily reports with summarized data on the number of serious events per day at the country level. The data source, provided by the Ministry of Interior and Public Security, comes from the Chilean Police. Serious events include looting, fire, destruction of private or public property and other events of the same nature. 13 Since the report is based on integrated data, it does not include key information such as the category and magnitude of these serious events, or the location where they took place. This prevents us from analyzing key dimensions of the phenomenon, like contagion effects between cities. Nevertheless, the data is rich and some interesting patterns can be observed from the aggregated data as shown in Fig. 2 (a), where λ (t) represents the number of serious events that occur at a given time t.
1. The most prominent episode was the one that started in October 18 th of 2019 in Santiago, event (1), reaching 350 serious events by Oct. 21 st , after it started spreading to other cities in the country, as discussed in Section II A. (3) and (4) of Fig. 2 (a) represents a warning to use integrated data because we may dealing with spatially separated riot episodes occurring in different cities. Thus, we are not able to split the very essence of each local riot episode and study contagion effects.
The events
3.
Another key finding is that serious events occur rather periodically, on a weekly basis. This is possibly explained because most violent acts occurred every Friday afternoon, becoming somehow a symbolic day of the social movement. The exponentially decreasing behavior we observe for the Chilean case is depicted in Fig. 2(b) , which plots the same data as in Fig. 2 (a) but in a semi-logarithmic scale. Under this scale the linear behavior in time corresponds naturally to an exponential behavior of the original variable. As far as we can see, five of six events somehow follow a linear behavior after each event was triggered. As we shall see later on in Sec. IV, this mean life time is inversely proportional to the corresponding slope.
(a) (1) T = 0 is set on October 18 th 2019, the day that the violent social unrest started in Santiago downtown. We notice the existence of about 6 extreme events. The colored curves represent the theoretical fits using the epidemic model (See Section IV). The fits are labeled as follows: The extreme event fit of the event (1) corresponds to the red curve; (2) corresponds to orange; (4) corresponds to cyan; (5) corresponds to blue; and, (6) corresponds to purple. The fitting parameters will be discussed in Section V and listed in the Table II .
(b)
The semi-log plot shows the exponential decay after reaching peak activity. The lines correspond to the fit: log λ (t) = −ωt + b, showing the desired exponential decay of the model. The slopes are summarized in Table II .
III. AGENT-BASED MODEL FOR RIOTS
Riot episodes can be modeled at different levels depending of the subject of analysis. At a micro-scale the object of interest is the behavior of individuals, while at a global macro-scale the focus is on cities or even states. In this section we follow a micro level approach applying agent-based modelling.
A. The model
Agent-based models applied to riot episodes are based on the premise that potential rioters decide whether to join a public manifestation or not, in the same way as a common crime occurs. 4, 14, 15 Therefore, it is assumed that each citizen performs a cost/benefit analysis influenced by three factors: 1) an incentive related to the perceived benefit of traveling to a given destination (the Z j term in (1) below); 2) a first disincentive related to the effort of actually undertaking the journey to the destination (the exp (−β r d i j ) term in (1) below); and 3) a second disincentive related to the possibility of being arrested at destination (the exp −
term in (1) below). Fig.  3 shows a scheme of the incentive-displacement mechanism that motivate individuals to move from a location i to j to start a riot, such as a comercial center, mall or retail area. Following the model of Davies et al., 4 used to describe the London riots of 2011, the potential benefit of travelling from a residential area i to a site j at time t is given by:
where Z j is the expected benefit of being at site j given its desirability (measured as retail space in the original model), d i j is the Euclidean distance between i and j (the minus sign represents the cost that the participant has to assume) and the third term
corresponds to the "deterrence", which is a function of the ratio of the police force P j (t) to rioters R j (t) at site j. It reflects the probability of being arrested by police forces. The symbol s represents the floor function, that is s = Integer part of s, and it takes into account the empirical fact that when the police is outnumbered by rioters (γ r P j (t) < R j (t)) the disorder gets out of control and they are unable to arrest rioters without the addition of back up resources 16 . Finally, the parameters α r , β r and γ r must be calibrated using the available data.
The probability that an individual living in i participates from a crowd after travelling to site j should represent itself a transition. This can be represented by a logistic function because it is a useful way to represent the existence of a threshold at which rioting is likely to occur. Therefore, as in Davies et al. we consider
where ρ i is a measure of the deprivation at site i, stemming from the empirical fact that residents that live in impoverished areas are more prone to be engaged in criminal behavior 17 . This is called the "probability of offending" 4 . Therefore, the total number of new crowd participants will be given by
where η is a transition rate and I i (t) is the number of inactive residents located in i at time t. Therefore, if A i (t) and I i (t) are the number of active and inactive populations respectively in site i, then after a time step δt, which represents the usual time scale that characterizes the typical motion of individuals, we can set the evolution rule:
where N i (t) is the total number of new crowd participants as defined in Eq. (2), and C i (t) represents the total arrest of rioters from i. Both A i (t) and C i (t) depend explicitly on the expectation amplitudes W i j (t) as follows. Once a citizen decides to join a protest she or he has to move towards a desired location, this process is based on an entropy-maximizing spatial interaction model (SIM) which estimates the most probable destination j for a given origin i. 18 Before computing the number of rioters, we modify the expression to take into account the attractiveness, W i j of Eq.
(1). Because of the motion of individuals is not instantaneous, the potential benefit changes dynamically over the path trajectory, therefore we need to consider reaction delays from the riot participants. To do that, we compute the temporal average of W i j (t) over the previous L r time steps to obtain the "effective attractiveness" W e i j between i and j as follows
Accordingly, if A i (t) is the activated population at time t, coming from the residential area i, then, the number of rioters from i being active at j will be: 19
Furthermore, adding the previous expression over all residential locations i, we obtain the total number of rioters reaching the j-zone
Similarly, the requested police force depends on the expected benefit Z j of the zone (an area with low expected benefits would not justify any police force deployment) and the number of rioters R j . This quantity is modeled by:
, where α p and γ p are parameters. In the same way we obtain the "effective attractiveness", we compute the "effective demand" by taking the average accross the most recent L p time steps
This demand is completely independent from the spatial location of destinations, meaning that two places with similar attractiveness and number of rioters will be assigned the same number of police forces, without taking into account any travelled distance involved in reaching a given destination. The number of police officers assigned to each location j depends on the total police force, P total , and the effective demand:
The rioters from area i arrested by all police forces is obtained by multiplying the arrest rate γ by the sum of the product of the number of active rioters at sites j and the probability of being arrested,
where T i j (t) is defined in Eq. (6). This last expression enters in equation (3) and closes the system, making it a selfconsistent model. Fig. 4 show the temporal evolution of the total number of rioters R total (t) = ∑ j R j (t) as a function of time.
The model was implemented over a squared grid of size 16 × 16, where each grid element has only an initial inactive population of 10, with all individuals sharing the same deprivation ρ i = 1. Acting as targets, a central region of size 4 × 4 with a value of Z j = 1 for all grid elements. To ensure the 4 . The plot shows the temporal evolution of the total number of rioters (R total (t)). The dynamics present a regime in which the population of rioters increases in a decelerated fashion. At a time t p , the police force is deployed, and the number of rioters starts to decrease exponentially in time. In the simulation the red and blue curves corresponds to t p = 300, and t p = 500 respectively. The inset shows a semi-log plot of R total (t) vs. time showing clearly an exponential decay of the number of rioters with the same decaying rate independently of t p formation of an initial riot, we assume that there are no police forces present at t = 0, but they are included later in the dynamics reaching a total of 2300 officers at t p . In Fig. 4 we depict the effect of the police in the total number of rioters. We use this approach following the original Davies et al. formulation, on the grounds that using this very simple configuration produces two different and mutually excluding scenarios: i) Police forces take complete control of the situation and the incident is eventually dissipated; ii) Police forces are overwhelmed and are unable to take control of the situation if reinforcements are not added. This dichotomous behavior depends on the initial number of police officers and is a byproduct of the floor function of the capture rate presented in Eq. (9). When P j (t) < R j (t) the police forces completely lose control of the situation, since the floor function turns them unable to perform any arrest. The numerical parameters used in the simulation are shown in Table I . We emphasize that this model assumes explicitly that the police force is the cause of the decaying mechanism of the total number of rioters.
B. Mean-Field approximation
The mean-field approximation considers that there is a limit in which the system is spatially homogeneous, that is it relates the variables to its average values, briefly
In this way, all other spatially dependent quantities become uniform.
Assuming a mean-field approximation one has:
Finally, because of the presence of the police force the lost term, C i (t) becomes:
where in the last approximation we have taken the large N limit. Finally, equations (3) and (4) becomē
Because of the functional dependence of ρ offended in eq. (2) on the activity A j , its mean-field approximation is intrinsically non-linear. On the other hand, in the epidemic-like model, this contagion-like term is usually assumed that it is proportional to the activityĀ(t), which simplifies the dynamical system (10). Thus, in this limit, we obtain a usual contagion model like the one proposed by Burbeck, et al. 3 . We discuss this model in the following section.
IV. EPIDEMIC-LIKE MODEL FOR RIOTS
A. Model, definitions and basic properties
By analogy with infectious diseases Burbeck, et al. 3 introduced an epidemic-like model that considers the total number of active rioters,Ā(t), and the number of individuals susceptible to join a riotĪ(t). Further, assuming that the number of riot events, λ (t), is proportional to the number of rioters, i.e. where α is assumed to be constant with units of (events)/(number of individuals). Then, the model proposes that ρ offended is proportional to the number of active rioters, that is ρ offended ∼Ā(t) (we adapt in the current paper the notations proposed by Davies et al. 4 and Bonnasse-Gahot et al. 6 ):
Here, ω and β , with units of 1/time and 1/time × 1/events, are parameters of the problem, that represent the exit rate from the riot events class and the transmission rate per riot event.
Finally, this set of ordinary differential equations is complemented by the initial conditions:
As a first consequence of the model, one has that the number of inactive individuals, which are the ones susceptible to join a riot, decrease strictly in time, therefore the asymptotic dynamics is: σ (t) → 0, thus, λ (t) → 0 as t → ∞ as well. More important, this system is integrable, this property solves exactly the problem, and provides a simple frame of analysis of the contagion model. Dividing (11) by (12) one gets:
Here we define the shorthand notation ν = ω β . The constant C should be fixed by the initial conditions (13) , so that:
In principle the integral (15) solves the problem. Nevertheless, to find the time dependent behavior one replaces (15) into (12), thus
B. Activation of rioting epidemics and their prevention
It is interesting to answer the question about what happens if we introduce a small number of rioters (λ 0 /α) into a population of susceptibles to join a riot (σ 0 /α); will there be an epidemic of riot events? The dynamics depends crucially on the initial value σ 0 , more precisely it depends on if σ 0 is greater or smaller than ν = ω/β . Indeed, dσ /dt < 0 for all t (since the right hand side of eqn. (12) is negative) and dλ /dt > 0 if and only if σ > ν (see the right hand side of eqn. (11)). Therefore, λ (t) increases as long as σ > ν, but since σ (t) is decreasing, λ (t) eventually will decrease and approach zero. Hence, if σ 0 < ν, then λ (t) decreases strictly to zero exponentially for all t (the right hand side of eqn. (11) is always negative), which means no riot events epidemic. On the other hand, if σ 0 > ν, then the right hand side of eqn. (11) is first positive and hence λ (t) first increases to a maximum, which is attained when σ = ν, and then the right hand side of eqn. (11) becomes negative and so λ (t) decreases strictly to zero exponentially. This last dynamics means that a riot events epidemic occured. In this case the initial number of susceptible individuals (potential rioters) was sufficient for active rioters to "infect" susceptible individuals to join the riots and produce riot events. That way, riot events invade the population up to a certain point (maximum), and then eventually decay. This simple dynamics is represented in Fig. 5 (b) , for σ 0 < ν (no epidemic) and σ 0 > ν (epidemic).
Regardless of the initial value of σ , λ decreases to zero as
Therefore, the long time behavior for λ decays exponentially in time and the decaying rate is just the parameter ω, which is why it may be seen as the inverse of mean life-time of the riot event, that we denote by τ, thus we explicitly define τ = 1/ω. The quantity σ 0 /ν = β σ 0 × 1 ω = β σ 0 τ is a threshold quantity, which in epidemiological modelling is called the Basic Reproduction Number and is usually denoted by R 0 20,21 . Its value determines the dynamics of the system since a riot events epidemic occurs when σ 0 /ν > 1 which is equivalent to R 0 > 1, and no riot events epidemic happens when R 0 < 1. The interpretation of R 0 = β σ 0 τ in the context of riot activity is that it is the average number of secondary riot events caused by a single riot event introduced into a population of susceptible individuals (potential rioters) of size σ 0 /α over the course of that single riot event (τ = 1/ω). This can be explained step by step in the following way: β is the riot events transmission rate, which is a parameter that can be explained as the product between the contact rate of an active rioter with susceptible rioters and the probability per contact that such a contact produces "infection", i.e. produces a new active rioter that produce rioting events. Hence, one riot event produces β σ 0 new riot events per unit of time in a population with σ 0 /α susceptible individuals (σ 0 potential riot events). Since ω is the parameter that represents the exit rate from the riot events class, τ = 1/ω is the mean life-time of each riot event (see eqn. (22) and its explanation). Therefore, β σ 0 τ is the number of new riot events in a population with σ 0 /α susceptible individuals (σ 0 potential riot events) produced by one riot event during the time it lasts on average. In this simple model the transition from a dynamic displaying an epidemic of riot events or not, is simply characterized by the initial value of potential riot events (σ 0 ), the riot transmission rate (β ) and the duration of a riot event (τ). In particular, if β and τ are fixed, the bifurcation scheme of the system is caracterized by a change in the initial state of potential rioters.
Authorities involved in politics and security would like to control and prevent riot events to become epidemic. Models like the ones presented in this section can give qualitative insight of riot event dynamics to guide public safety policy makers. As discussed above, the threshold quantity R 0 = β σ 0 τ determines riot event dynamics. In order to prevent riot events epidemics, a public safety policy, in a population with a fixed number of σ 0 /α potential rioters, would need to find measures that reduces τ and/or β such that R 0 < 1, in which case a riot events epidemic would be prevented. Fig. 6(a) shows the threshold curve R 0 = 1 for σ 0 = 592.75 [e] that corresponds to the first peak in Fig. 2(a) . As pictured, the curve divides the parameter space (β , τ) into two regions: the region above the curve represents parameter sets for which riot event epidemics occur (R 0 > 1) and the region below the curve represents parameter sets for which no epidemics occur (R 0 < 1).
The major riot events epidemic (the first peak in Fig. 2(a) ) corresponds to a parameter set of a mean life-time duration fot each riot event of τ ≈ 2 days, a transmission rate β = 0.0059 [e −1 d −1 ] per riot event and a population of susceptible rioters that would be responsible for σ 0 = 592.75 [e] potential riot events (see Table II ). This riot events epidemic has a basic reproduction number of R 0 = 6.92941 (see Table II ) which is indeed greater than 1 (epidemic) and its parameter set is represented by the dot in Fig. 6(a) . In order to prevent future riot events epidemics of this form, in a population with σ 0 = 592.75 [e] potential riot events, a public safety policy that sufficiently reduces the mean life-time duration of a riot event (τ) would be able to prevent such an epidemic. Fig.  6(a) shows that reducing τ below 0.285 days, while fixing β , produces a rioting situation in the region where R 0 < 1 and hence a riot events epidemic is prevented. The mean lifetime duration of a riot event can be reduced for instance by creating desincentives that make rioters keep their rioting activity controlled, for instance more police presence or creating and/or efficiently implementing laws that target violent offense against public order.
Other riot control measures could be measures that target the riot events transmission rate β . This for instance by reducing the contact rate between active rioters and the susceptible population, or by lowering the probability that an active rioter upon contact with a susceptible individual "infects" him or her, creating more rioters and hence more riot events. The effectiveness in using social media and the intrinsic characteristics of a how a population communicates (physical or virtual) may be key to predict the behavior of an upcoming riot activity.
If the number of potential riot events existing initially in a population (σ 0 ) changes, the public safety policy that reduces the duration of a riot event or targets the contact rate between individuals could change. Fig. 6(b) shows that in a population where now σ 0 = 85.8 [e], the threshold curve changes and hence the threshold values por the parameters, which are needed to pass from the region R 0 > 1 to the region R 0 < 1, change.
C. Hamiltonian dynamics
The existence of the conservation quantity (14) indicates that the dynamics follows as a tangential flow from the conserved quantity. In other words may be written in terms of a hamiltonian dynamics. Let be,
then equations (11) and (12) may be written as:
Thus, taking the canonical variables (x, y) as:
and a Hamiltonian H = β (e x + e y ) − ωy, Table II which produce R 0 = 6.92941 > 1. Fig. (a) shows parameter set regions where R 0 > 1 and R 0 < 1.
then, one writes the Burbeck, et al. epidemic model with a Hamiltonian structure:
Moreover, as already shown after (15) , the model is integrable. This fact will be pertinent in the following applications. By construction, the model cannot predict more than one riot event. Indeed, because the number of potential rioters, σ , decreases strictly in time (see eqn. (12) ), the graphical scheme presented in Fig. 5 shows that the dynamics does not present a returning point. Therefore, there is no way to revert the trajectory in the (λ , σ ) phase portrait. We conclude that to reach a dynamical behavior with various events one needs to modify the original model by including other basic phenomena.
Essentially, the number of potential rioters must to increase in some way, this can be done in different source terms. The simplest way is to introduce a linear growth rate of the individuals that eventually may join a riot, σ , more precisely a ασ term on the right hand side of (12) . This model results to be well known Lotka-Volterra population dynamics model. Another possibility is a time dependent forcing. We summarizes these different possibilities in the following short hand notation:
Here f (t) denotes a periodic forcing, that we will be precissed later on, and ξ (t) is a stochastic variable which we considered as a δ -correlated white noise. More formally, the first two moments are ξ (t) = 0, and ξ (t)ξ (t ) = δ (t − t ). Here the function δ (t) denotes a Dirac δ -function which simulates extremely short-time correlation. More specifically, δ (t) is zero at every time except at t = 0, and its integral satisfies
Therefore, equations (11) and (25) may be written in the following form after a suitable change of variables (20) and (21) to a set of Hamilton equations plus an additive forcing:
where H is given by (22) .
1. The case of constant forcing.
In this case the epidemic model becomes a special Lotka-Volterra system that displays a pure oscillatory behavior. The dynamics is quite trivial, more important it is quite un-realistic therefore we will not discuss it in the current context.
The case of periodic forcing.
As stressed the social movement possesses a natural weekly period. A natural way to model that is by taking the periodic excitation:
Here f 0 is the forcing intensity, T is the period, and the δfunction emulates a time localized excitation of the variable σ , a kind of periodic kick. The equations of motion for this kick-epidemic model reads
The whole solution (x(t), y(t)) for all t is obtained by imposing at each t = ld the continuity of the function x(t) and a jump condition on y(t) which is obtained directly after an integration of Eq. (30) in a small interval, t ∈ [lT − , lT + ], around t = lT . The jump conditions read
where y(lT + ) is the value of y(t) just after t = lT and y(lT − ) is the value of y(t) just before t = lT . In the original variables, if f 0 is positive the kick will increase the number of potential rioters, thus a possibility to re-start a riot if eventually σ (lT + ) = e f 0 σ (lT − ) > ν. On the other hand, the number of events, i.e. the λ variable, is a continuous function at the kick. From a mathematical perspective, when f 0 = 0 the system is perturbed by periodic kicks which breaks the integrability of the system. The value of H, defined in Eq. (22) , changes at each kick but takes a constant value H l over each interval t ∈ [lT, (l + 1)T ] where the system is integrable. The equations (29) and (30) can be solved in each of these intervals, the solution is formally given by (15) and (16) .
Using this formal solution in the (x, y) variables together with the jump condition (31) we can construct a stroboscopic or Poincaré map M : (x((l + 1)T + ), y((l + 1)T + )) = M x(lT + ), y(lT + ) , (32) that provides a mapping from one kick to the next one.
The nonlinear map, M , can in principle be expressed explicitly, however it is not required for our pourpposes. Due to the Hamiltonian nature of the evolution, this map has the symplectic property. Maps with this property has been studied vastly in the past. As we know from the properties of the map (32), the solutions are either periodic, quasi-periodic or chaotic 22 .
A periodic behavior appears as a fixed point in the (λ (lT ), σ (lT )) phase portrait of the nonlinear mapping (See Fig. 7(a)-(b) ). As shown in Fig. 7 (a) it appears that this fixed point is elliptic so that the orbits around it represent a quasiperiodic behavior as it may be seen in Fig. 7(c) . Finally, around the border of the orbits there are chaotic trajectories as it can be seen in Fig. 7(d) .
3. The case of a stochastic forcing.
In the case of a stochastic forcing, the trajectories are erratic and quite different for various realizations. This can be seen in Figs. 8 where seven different stochastic realizations of equations (11) and (25) (with the stochastic forcing ξ (t)) are plotted together. The initial contidion is the same for all realizations: (λ (0), σ (0)) ≈ (1, 2). For the numerics we use the Euler-Mayurama scheme 23 .
As it is well known only a probabilistic description makes sense in this kind of of differential equations. In the case of eqns. (26) and (33) (with the stochastic forcing ξ (t)), the stationary probability is the so called Gibbs measure:
The maximum of probability, corresponds to the minima of the Hamiltonian (22) . This hamiltonian, H, has no minima in the x-direction, thus the most probable situation is as x → −∞, that is λ → 0. On the other hand, H has a minima along the y direction, which is for e y = ν, that is σ = ν. Therefore, we conclude that in the stochastic model the social system presents a small probability of damaging events, while the latent population to make disturbs and joint riots is in average critical σ = σ c = ν. Because of this fact, the model presents similarities with the mechanism of self-organized criticality 24 , which is common in many "cathastrophic" systems as avalanches and earthquakes 25 .
V. DATA ANALYSIS
To fit the data with the solution of (15) one needs to fit the parameters ω, β together with the initial condition: {t 0 , λ 0 , σ 0 }, that is, we need to find five parameters. However, we are able to reduce the number of parameters noticing that the asymptotic expression (17) allows us to find ω from a simple linear regression that fits the observations in Fig. 2(b) .
Also, a relation for λ 0 may be derived from a condition for the maximum value of λ that arises from λ = λ max and σ = ν at t = t max . By doing that λ 0 becomes a fixed parameter in terms of λ max . The other parameters are given by:
Therefore, among the five parameters only β and σ 0 need to be calibrated to find the best fit. Fig. 2(a) , shows the best fit of the five different events. The different parameters are summarized in Table II . Finally, we compare both models. We have adjusted the agent-based model focusing on the main event (1) of Fig. 2 .
As it can be seen in Fig. 9 we fit the riot activity using the agent-based model of section III with the same parameters in Table I for t p = 300 but with a capture rate γ = 0.007.
Although the initial phases in which the riot is setting-up are different, given that the growth phase does not display the same behavior because the contagion dynamics are quite different in both models (in the ABMρ offended is not linearly proportional to the riot activity) we find that both models fit the data reasonably well. We observe that the exponentially decaying regime in both models are similar because the −γĀ(t) term in (10) and −ωλ term in (11) are linear in the riot activity and events respectively. Table I but with a capture rate γ = 0.007, and t p = 300.
VI. DISCUSSION
Motivated by the 2019 Chilean social unrest that caused costly infrastructure damage and serious injuries to a group of the population, we take advantage of mathematical modelling and numerical simulations to analyze this complex social phenomenon and increase our understanding of how this type of events evolve through time.
We analyze the dynamics of the Chilean rioting episodes from different perspectives: agent-based models and epidemic-like models. The main difference between these two approaches relates to the way that inactive rioters become active. In the agent-based model this activation process is non-linear in the active population, while in the epidemic-like model it is merely linear. We find that both models present qualitatively similar behavior as they share an exponential decaying of the riot activity in terms of the number of events. When comparing the dynamics obtained from both models with the evolution of the most significant event that started in October 18 th 2019, we observe that they depict very similar patterns. From a dynamical system perspective, we show that the epidemic-like model can be interpreted in a relatively easy way and possibly used to qualitatively guide policy measures to preserve public safety, and it presents a richer explanatory power due to the existence of an underlying Hamiltonian structure. In fact, under the influence of a periodic forcing, the dynamics may display three types of behavior depending on the parameters: 1) periodic oscillation; 2) quasi-periodic oscillation; or 3) chaotic dynamics. On the other hand, in the presence of a stochastic forcing, the most probable behavior places the system in a critical condition for contagion. Interestingly, this result tells us that social turmoil events may be in the same footing than the well-known phenomena of selforganized criticality, something that we plan to study in the next future.
Although all these properties are exciting and promising, it seems clear that the observed Chilean social phenomenon re-quires a more careful and interdisciplinary effort. In particular, several open questions remain open. From a psychological perspective, what triggered the rage to flourish in a substantial percentage of the population provoking massive sentiments of unfairness that found sympathy even in the well-off social class? How could we include these psychological factors in an epidemic-like model? How did riot propagation dynamics occur throughout the country? From a social network perspective, can we understand the speed at which ideas and opinions (fake and true) become popular in social media, influencing group thinking and, therefore, group behavior? What enables the spread of fake news, and how damaging are they in terms of group contagion that can lead to catastrophic outcomes? How can we avoid the spread of these fake news within a social network? How do these last three questions modify the contagion rates?
All these questions deserve some attention not only from an academic perspective, but also from a policymaking point of view. If mathematical modelling and numerical simulations are able to predict the dynamics of violent social turmoils and provide useful information that can help control them and mitigate their damaging effects, it becomes a moral responsibility from scientists to help authorities involved in politics and security. We assume this responsibility and plan to conduct further research, following an interdisciplinary approach, to help answering some of the questions posed above. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS P.C., J.O., S.R., and K.V. thank the Facultad de Ingeniería y Ciencias fund for research (Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez) and C.C. wishes to acknowledge the support of Universidad de los Andes (CL) through FAI initiatives.
VII. APPENDIXES Appendix A: Timeline summary
This Appendix summarizes the main events of the social unrest discussed in Section II A and Fig. 1 .
• Monday Oct., 7 th 2019: Under the slogan "Evade!" secondary students self-organized via social networks to massively evade the subway fare in the capital city of Santiago as a consequence of a 3.75 percent fare hike of CLP$30. Although this increase represents less than 5 cents of a US dollar, low-income families spend between 13 and 28 percent of their budget on public transportation.
• Monday Oct., 14 th 2019: Student protests continue in Santiago and several stations on Line 5 were closed in the afternoon after violent incidents were reported.
• Friday Oct., 18 th 2019 (The zero day): The escalation of protests. Within two weeks the social unrest turned massive and violent; destruction of the subway stations in Santiago was coordinated, damaging almost 60 percent of them. The entire Metro system was closed after the attacks, and it remained closed for several days and weeks. The police force tried dispersing the crowds firing rubber bullets, teargas and water cannons.
• Saturday Oct., 19 th 2019: The violence continues. Shops were looted, buses were set alight and clashes occurred between the security forces and rioters. The President imposed a curfew in Santiago from 22:00 to 07:00 hours and the army was taken to the streets. After rioters started spreading to other cities, the President declared a state of emergency in Valaparaíso and Concepción. The increase in the metro fare was cancelled.
• Sunday Oct., 20 th 2019: As violent protests continued, the President publicly announced on the evening that "We are at war against a powerful enemy...". 26 The next day, the head of national defense, Javier Iturriaga, assured in a press conference that "I am not at war with anyone...". As violent protests continued spreading, curfews were imposed in the Santiago Metropolitan Region, and the regions of Valparaíso, Bíobío, and Coquimbo.
• Friday Oct., 25 th 2019: In spite of the palliative measures promoted by the Chilean Government, the citizens went back to the streets. Over a million people took to the streets in Santiago, and thousands more throughout Chile, becoming the largest pacific demonstration after Chile returned to democracy.
• Wednesday Oct., 30 th 2019: Amid the ongoing clashes between protesters and security forces, the Chilean Government decides to pull out of hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and The UN Climate Change Conference (COP 25).
• Sunday Nov., 10 th 2019: Towards a new Constitution. The Government agreed to initiate a process to draft a new Constitution.
• Monday Nov., 12 th 2019: Change of cabinet. As a result of the massive protests, the President reshuffled his cabinet. He replaced the interior and finance ministers, and the government spokesperson.
• Friday Nov., 15 th 2019: Lawmakers agreed and signed an "Agreement for Peace and a New Constitution", an agreement that was regarded as "historic". In the referendum that will take place on April 26 th 2020 voters will be asked whether they approve the idea of a new constitution and whether current lawmakers should serve on the commission that would redraft the document.
• Tuesday Nov., 19 th 2019: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, an agency under the Organization of American States, condemned the excessive use of force during social protests and called on the authorities to order state security forces to immediately cease their disproportionate use of force. Amid public outcry over eye injuries suffered by hundreds of protesters, the police decides to cease the use of rubber bullets against rioters.
• Friday Nov., 22 nd 2019: Rejection of the Amnesty International report. Both the Government and the Chilean Army openly rejected the report prepared by Amnesty International, a non-governmental organization that investigates violations of human rights occurred in different countries. The organization recorded at least 23 cases of human rights violations, documented in eight different regions since the start of the social unrest.
• Saturday Nov., 23 rd 2019: The social turmoil leaves 23 dead. After the President recognized that there may have been a breach of protocols for the use of force by the police in Chile, the official death toll was announced during the social outbreak, which reached 23.
